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286 OREGON LAW REVIEW
stitutional.19 Congress might pass an act making all conditions in restraint
of interstate commerce invalid; the result would be that the offeree might
accept the offer and disregard the conditions. A state could not refuse to
enforce his rights under the contract, not because it must enforce his inchoate
right to do interstate business, but because his contract rights are property
within the 14th amendment, and the supposed conditions do not limit them,
being invalid under the federal legislation. If the state makes the offer with
conditions attached in restraint of interstate commerce the conditions are
void, being beyond its power to make; if an individual is the offeror, the
conditions might be void under appropriate federal legislation, not because
of a lack of power to make that kind of an offer, but because the conditions
wonld be illegal. -Bernard C. Gavit.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-REASONAHLE EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER-In
any application of the constitutional requirement that a taking of private
property by the state be a reasonable taking we are necessarily dealing in
mental concepts. As to whether or not given action is reasonable depends
ultimately upon the judges' ideas of reasonableness which in turn depend
upon the experience, learning and philosophy of the judges themselves. In the
recent ease of Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge,' the majority of the Supreme
Court of the United States say: "Mere stock ownership in a corporation,
owning and operating a drug store, can have no real or substantial relation
to the public health,-the act creates an unreasonable and unnecessary re-
striction upon private business." The minority say: "A standing criticism
of the use of corporations in business is that it causes such business to be
owned by people who do not know anything about it.-The divorce between
the power of control and knowledge is an evil.-It is enough if the questioned
act has a manifest tendency to cure or at least to make the evil less."
Other language of the opinions would indicate that perhaps the difference
in result may be that the majority requires reasonable evidence to support
the reasonableness of the regulation: the minority requires only a scintilla
of evidence. This would be a departure from the accepted rules that one who
attacks an act as unconstitutional has the burden of proof, and that all
reasonable presumptions are in favor of the action of the state. But if the
point were specifically raised both sides would undoubtedly pay lip-service
to these rules. The majority opinion is really upon the theory that acting
itpon judicial knowledge and the evidence in thei case there was no evidence
to sustain the reasonableness of the legislation.
A regulation of private property must have in truth a reasonable founda-
tion. The rights of private property are protected by the Constitution against
every unreasonable taking even although the taking be under the guise of
social welfare. Where a private right leaves off and social welfare begins
depend in truth on the length and breadth of the so-colled private right.
lt For example, in the Bedford Stone Company ease the basis of the plain-
tiff's action was an alleged violation of the Federal Anti-Trust Law. Bedford
Stone Co. v. Journeyman Stone Cutters' Assoc., 274 U. S. 37, 47 Sup. Ct. 522,
71 L. Ed. 916 (1927). See also, Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. U. S., 175 U. S.
211, 20 Sup. Ct. 96, 44 L. Ed. 130 (1899); Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v.
U. S., 226 U. S. 20, 33 Sup. Ct. 9, 57 L. Ed. 107 (1912).
1 73 L. Ed. 45, 49 Sup. Ct. 57 (1928). The facts are stated, post, p. 295.
NOTE AND COMMENT
(Or the other way about-where social welfare leaves off and a private right
begins depend in truth on the length and breadth of social welfare.) Rights
are intellectual concepts. They exist and are protected by the law only in
relation to the rights of others as individuals and society as a whole (the
state). They have been conceived by the mind: they must be measured by
the mind. So when a judge is measuring a private right, as against a con-
flieting social right, he must inevitably answer the question, where ought they
to stop? The decision is really an expression of the judge's philosophy of
life: if it is individualistic he will reach one result: if it is socialistic he
may reach the opposite result.
A recent decision by the Supreme Court of Washington is another illustra-
tion of the truth of these assertions. In Brown v. City of Seattle2 it was
held that an ordinance which required all butcher shops to close at six o'clock
in the evening was unconstitutional, being an unreasonable regulation. The
court could find no justification in it. In those fields, however, where we are
accustomed to quite a little regulation, an innovation is more readily upheld.
For example, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York recently upheld a statute which provided that no eye-glasses were
to be sold except under the supervision of a licensed optometrist.$
-Bernard C. Gavit.
JUBisDICTiN-WaoNG SiDE Or niu, CoURT--In Brakebush v. Assen1 the
complaint sets forth separately 13 alleged causes of suit founded upon the
agreed and reasonable value of labor expended by the plaintiff and 12 others,
his assignors. The averments of work performed are followed by allegations
of liens upon some logs. Defendant demurred on the ground that each cause
as alleged did not state a cause of suit. Held, "That portion of section 390,
ORooN Lws, which provides 'No cause shall be dismissed for having been
brought on the wrong side of the court,' was enacted for the express purpose
of saving the necessity previously existing of dismissing a cause of action
brought in equity which should have been brought at law, or a suit brought
at law where the proper remedy was in equity. When the complaint was
before the court upon demurrer it stated a cause of action for work and labor
performed; hence the court could not dismiss the cause, although brought in
equity. The limit of its jurisdiction was to remand it to the law side of the
court."
Equity grew up as a system of jurisprudence and procedure entirely
apart from law. The rules determining the court to which resort must be
had in a particular situation were not clear and easy of application. Distinc-
tions narrow and refined were drawn by the courts and a suitor might be denied
justice on the ground that he had chosen the wrong tribunal. At his peril
he had to decide whether to sue at law or equity. Under modern procedure,
however, the distinctions have been largelyl done away with. The New York
statute reads: "There is only one form of civil action. The distinction be-
tween actions at law and suits in equity, and the form of these actions and
suits have been abolished." This provision is enacted in most of the code
2 272 Pac. 517 (1928).
a D. S. Kresge Co. v. Ottenger, 29 Fed. (2d) 762 (1928).
1 267 Pae. 1035 (Or., 1928).
